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RESPONSE 
THE SCOPE OF TRADEMARK LAW IN THE AGE OF THE BRAND 
PERSONA 
Laura A. Heymann* 
 description of a typical trademark infringement suit begins 
with the assumption that acquiring a desired product in the 
marketplace involves a search process, which incurs costs in terms 
of time spent, cognitive attention, and other resources. Consumers 
use trademarks as heuristics to reduce the amount of these costs. 
The trademark Levi’s, for example, allows a consumer to quickly 
find the jeans she knows fit her well without having to try on multi-
ple pairs each time she goes to the department store. (This, of 
course, assumes that Levi Strauss & Company maintains the same 
design for its jeans over time, which trademark law does not obli-
gate it to do.) Trademark law uses the concept of “consumer confu-
sion” to describe a scenario in which the ability of a trademark to 
function as a shorthand is called into question because more than 
one producer is using the mark to brand its product. Thus, the theo-
ry goes, if we eliminate uses of trademarks that lead to “confusion” 
among consumers—the unauthorized Levi’s jeans, for example—we 
will stave off “search costs.” 
Professor Mark McKenna’s article “A Consumer Decision-Making 
Theory of Trademark Law”1 brings welcome attention to what has 
become an increasingly unhelpful vocabulary. As he notes, the terms 
“confusion” and “search costs” are not always useful ways of charac-
                                                                    
* Class of 2014 Professor of Law, College of William & Mary – Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law. Many thanks to John Alford, Mark Badger, Mark McKenna, and Jeremy Sheff. 
1 98 Va. L. Rev. 67 (2012). 
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terizing the harms that result from trademark infringement. Consid-
er, for example, the typical trademark infringement case, in which 
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark misled the consumer 
into buying the impersonator’s product in lieu of the trademark 
holder’s product. Characterizing the defendant’s actions in this sce-
nario as unfair competition is uncontroversial because the defend-
ant took business away from the trademark owner through duplici-
ty rather than through persuasion. But trademark law doesn’t 
actually tell a nuanced story about the nature of the consumer’s 
harm. Perhaps the consumer was ultimately pleased with her pur-
chase, despite the fact that it was not what she initially intended to 
buy. Perhaps it is enough that she was provided with false infor-
mation, regardless of her ultimate assessment of the product. Per-
haps she will henceforth distrust the Levi’s trademark and instead 
try on several pairs of jeans to find the fit she likes or give up and 
turn to a different type of clothing altogether. Trademark law typi-
cally doesn’t delve too deeply into these questions, using “confu-
sion” and “search costs” to characterize the various possibilities in-
stead. A better sense of the harm that trademark law is supposed to 
remedy (and why it constitutes a harm) may not be crucial in a fake 
Levi’s scenario, but it becomes increasingly important the more the 
fact pattern moves away from the prototypical to more expansive 
theories of infringement. 
Moreover, many instances in which search costs or momentary 
consumer confusion do arise ultimately cause consumers no difficul-
ties or are seen as acceptable obstacles to a purchasing decision. The 
trademark “Delta” is used both with airlines and with faucets and so 
results in greater search costs than would occur under a trademark 
system that allowed each mark to be used by only one producer. En-
tering the term into a search engine, for example, might require ad-
ditional time spent in going to the second or third item on the list to 
find the desired result. But trademark law doesn’t prohibit the two 
companies from using the same mark despite its broad references to 
“search costs” and “consumer confusion.” 
As Professor McKenna demonstrates, glossing over these fact pat-
terns with general references to “confusion” or “search costs” risks a 
trademark law that is not sufficiently attentive to consumer inter-
ests. Indeed, as he notes, overprotection can work its own harms to 
consumers, depriving them of information that allows them to make 
decisions in the marketplace. Thus, Professor McKenna suggests, 
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trademark law should abandon its unhelpful vocabulary and focus 
instead on a core purpose: to protect consumers by prohibiting uses 
of another’s trademark that are likely to deceive consumers engaged 
in purchasing decisions, without targeting uses that merely waylay, 
influence, or inform consumers.2 
Although I share Professor McKenna’s views in this regard,3 I add 
here one note of caution: that we should be careful not to let these 
concerns cause us to take too narrow a view of the interests that are 
potentially at stake. Here and in previous work,4 Professor McKenna 
has taken the position that the harms to be avoided are instances in 
which consumers are misled into acquiring goods or services from 
producer B as a result of B’s unauthorized use of producer A’s 
trademark. Such harms might occur because B has thereby led con-
sumers to believe that A is the source of B’s goods or services, is re-
sponsible for the quality of B’s goods or services, or sponsors or 
otherwise authorizes B’s goods or services (although as to this last 
category, Professor McKenna would require evidence of materiality, 
as I discuss below). These are all believed to be instances of harm to 
consumers because each results in consumers’ acquisition of goods 
or services that they would not otherwise have purchased. 
Professor McKenna rejects, however, the view that trademark law 
should also be concerned about instances in which the unauthorized 
use of producer A’s mark is likely to deceive consumers into buying 
fewer goods or services from producer A, regardless of whether it 
misleads them into dealing with producer B. Such harms might oc-
cur when, for example, B’s use of A’s mark to falsely suggest that A 
has endorsed B’s goods leads offended consumers to stop doing 
business with A. Professor McKenna’s view that such claims are be-
yond trademark law’s proper scope is predicated, I think, on the 
view that trademark law is fundamentally about consumer protec-
tion, and so scenarios involving reputational or related harms to the 
mark holder are not consonant with that goal. It is true, as I will ex-
plain, that evidentiary concerns of the type Professor McKenna has 
raised are particularly important in dealing with reputation-related 
                                                                    
2 This, of course, assumes that we have a shared definition of what constitutes decep-
tion—for example, whether it requires intent or simply falsity. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, 
Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 Geo. L.J. 449 (2012). 
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4 Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 445 
(2010). 
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claims, lest trademark law become an all-purpose remedy for hurt 
feelings or brand management failures. But simply because a repu-
tation-related claim is expressed in terms of producer injury doesn’t 
mean that such claims don’t also have relevance for consumers. 
Reputation is, after all, the collective judgment of others, and so con-
sumers also have the need—consistent with Professor McKenna’s 
concern for consumer autonomy—for reliable information regard-
ing the companies about which they are forming such judgments.5 
One might argue that, regardless of any benefit to consumers of 
policing reputation-related claims, the Lanham Act doesn’t currently 
contemplate such reputational harms as a type of unfair competi-
tion. To the contrary, however, the Lanham Act currently provides, 
in Section 43(a), a cause of action for misrepresentations suggesting 
sponsorship or approval of one’s commercial activities by the 
trademark owner6—in other words, uses that rely on the reputation 
associated with the mark to deceive consumers who find that repu-
tation to be of value. Professor McKenna reads this statutory lan-
guage not only to describe the nature of the unlawful act but also to 
describe the nature of the harm: that consumers will thereby be 
misled into purchasing the defendant’s goods or services.7 (Profes-
sor McKenna would also require proof that the deception was mate-
rial to the purchasing decision in such cases.8) Hence, he contends—
no doubt correctly—that few consumers will decide “whether to see 
Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star based on whether they thought 
Wham-O gave the movie’s producers permission to suggest that one 
of the characters was injured on a Slip ’N Slide,”9 just as no one will 
base their decision on whether to see the film Dairy Queens on 
whether they think the ice cream chain has approved it.10 Similarly, 
in cases involving false assertions of celebrity endorsement, the 
question, according to Professor McKenna, is whether the use of the 
celebrity’s identity “might be material to consumers’ decisions to 
                                                                    
5 Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1341, 1349–50 (2011). 
6 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
7 McKenna, supra note 1, at 132 n.198. 
8 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 445.  
9 McKenna, supra note 1, at 84 (discussing Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
286 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). 
10 Id. at 125 (discussing Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 
(D. Minn. 1998)). 
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purchase the goods or services they think the celebrity has en-
dorsed.”11 
But it’s not clear why, unless one has a particular view of what 
constitutes consumers’ interests, Section 43(a) would not also sup-
port a claim that the defendant’s unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s 
mark would be likely to have a material effect on consumers’ deci-
sions regarding future dealings with the plaintiff. The singer Tom 
Waits, to take one example, brought suit under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act over Frito-Lay’s use of a voice impersonator who 
sounded like Waits in a Doritos radio commercial.12 Waits, who had 
taken a public stand against commercial endorsements on the 
grounds that such endorsements compromised artistic integrity, 
claimed that listeners would assume that Waits was endorsing the 
chips. The alleged harm in the case, and the focus of the court’s 
analysis, was not whether the use of the soundalike was likely to 
cause consumers to buy more Doritos (although we can presume 
Frito-Lay thought that would be the case). Rather, the alleged injury 
related to Waits’s consumer base: having long taken a stand against 
commercial endorsement, Waits was concerned that his fans would 
now think that he had sold out (and, presumably, stop buying his 
music based on this erroneous implication). Waits could not have 
prevailed on his claim if such reputational interests had been out-
side the scope of the Lanham Act.13 
Alternatively, one might argue that even if such claims are theo-
retically available, it is simply not the case that the unauthorized use 
of one company’s trademarks on an unrelated product will cause 
reputational harm to the plaintiff.14 It is almost certainly true as an 
evidentiary matter that no reputational harm to the plaintiff took 
place in the cases that Professor McKenna highlights—that no one 
stopped buying Slip ’N Slides or Dairy Queen sundaes simply be-
cause they disapproved of the company’s alleged association with 
the films in question. But as the Lowe’s retail chain found out in 
                                                                    
11 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 452. 
12 Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). 
13 For purposes of this discussion, I am putting aside the extent to which the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 
(2003), affects authorship-related claims going forward. 
14 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 4, at 436–37 (concluding that “any harm to producers 
from confusion about sponsorship or affiliation is quite attenuated: producers suffer no 
lost sales, and they are unlikely to suffer any reputational consequences absent addi-
tional information suggesting control over the partner”). 
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2011, when it faced protests after withdrawing its sponsorship of 
the television program All-American Muslim, consumers may well 
base their purchasing decisions on a company’s perceived sponsor-
ship or endorsement relationships.15 The evidence may therefore be 
case specific; this, coupled with the risk of broad claims by mark 
owners, might counsel (consonant with Professor McKenna’s gen-
eral proposal) that proof of materiality be required in each in-
stance.16 But the fact that reputational harms may not always be 
present is not a reason, in itself, to rule them outside the scope of 
the Lanham Act. 
Finally, one might argue that even if reputational harms exist (and 
cause related consumer harm), trademark infringement law will be 
excessively expanded if such claims are recognized. Reputational 
claims, Professor McKenna seems to suggest, are essentially trade-
mark dilution claims (of the tarnishment variety) dressed in trade-
mark infringement clothing, and so to the extent we are skeptical 
about the validity of dilution doctrine, we should be equally skepti-
cal of reputational claims.17 But tarnishment claims lack as their fac-
tual predicate the assertion at the core of a Section 43(a) claim: the 
defendant’s false assertion about the relationship between the mark 
                                                                    
15 Stuart Elliott & Brian Stelter, Controversy Drives Advertisers from “All-American 
Muslim”—Or Does It?, Media Decoder, NYTimes.com, Dec. 13, 2011, 8:14 PM, 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/controversy-drives-advertisers-
from-all-american-muslim-or-does-it (discussing Lowe’s decision and resulting pro-
tests); see also, e.g., Ken Belson & Richard Sandomir, Insuring Endorsements Against 
Athletes’ Scandals, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 2010, at D2 (noting that “[i]n the wake of the 
Tiger Woods scandal, insurers are being inundated with inquiries from corporations 
seeking to protect their investments, their brands and even their sales when their ce-
lebrity endorsers suffer public embarrassment”); Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stan-
go, Celebrity Endorsements, Firm Value and Reputation Risk: Evidence from the Tiger 
Woods Scandal (Aug. 10, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/knittel/www/papers/tiger_latest.pdf (analyzing drop in market 
value of companies with endorsement deals with Tiger Woods after revelation of his 
marital infidelity). 
16 The evidence regarding the reputational effect of unauthorized use of trademarks on 
unrelated goods is inconclusive. Heymann, supra note 5, at 1388 n.168 (citing conflict-
ing views). 
17 Prof. McKenna cites Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 
1972), involving an “Enjoy Cocaine” poster, as one such case. McKenna, supra note 1, at 
107 n.117. But under the court’s view of the case, the asserted harm was that consum-
ers would think that Coca-Cola was responsible for the poster and would decline to buy 
Coca-Cola products as a result. Gemini Rising, 346 F. Supp. at 1191 (“[P]laintiff’s good 
will and business reputation are likely to suffer in the eyes of those who, believing it 
responsible for defendant’s poster, will refuse to deal with a company which would 
seek commercial advantage by treating a dangerous drug in such jocular fashion.”). 
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holder and the defendant. Tarnishment claims, rather, contend that 
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark has created negative asso-
ciations with the mark; they are predicated on the assumption that 
consumers understand that the defendant and plaintiff are not re-
lated. Such claims do not, therefore, involve consumers’ assessment 
of the mark holder based on (falsely induced) beliefs about the mark 
holder’s activities and, for that reason, are not reputation-related 
claims.18 
Presented more broadly, however, this third argument merits ad-
ditional consideration. Perhaps trademark law is not the best doc-
trine to apply to reputation-related claims, even when harm to con-
sumer autonomy in the decision-making process exists. To the 
extent, for example, that we construe such claims as alleging false 
facts about the plaintiff by the defendant, we might resolve such 
cases as false advertising claims (depending on how broadly we 
view the concepts of advertising and competition)19 or as defama-
tion, trade libel, or product disparagement claims. Besides the pos-
sible benefit of doctrinal coherence, such claims also have the virtue 
of jurisprudence that is already attentive to the First Amendment 
concerns of potential defendants, among other considerations. 
Nonetheless, I am not yet confident that we can say that unfair com-
petition law is an inapt doctrine to deal with reputation-related 
claims, particularly given my view that such claims have significance 
for consumers and audiences due to reputation’s inherently social 
nature.20 We should be cautious, in any event, not to let our desire to 
move reputational claims outside of trademark law lead us to dis-
count the existence of brand reputational interests altogether. 
I raise this concern in part because I think that there is an oppor-
tunity for trademark scholarship to devote more time to considering 
ways in which to reconcile the interests of producers and consum-
ers. We have not yet had enough discussion about first principles, 
about where we might find trademark law’s version of copyright 
law’s “limited times,” authorship questions, and fair use considera-
tions—doctrines that require us to consider various competing and 
intergenerational interests.21 Trademark law has long been ready 
                                                                    
18 I explore this further in Heymann, supra note 5, at 1397–1400. 
19 Indeed, to the extent consumers have been diverted by such claims in the context of 
unrelated goods, it is from competing producers in the second market.  
20 See Heymann, supra note 5.  
21 The U.S. Supreme Court’s copyright decisions in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 
(2003), Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), and 
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for the same depth of public discussion about creators and audienc-
es, about the intellectual metes and bounds of property rights, and 
about the development of a positive conception of the public domain 
that has been so invigorating in copyright law. 
For the moment, we can recognize—as Professor McKenna’s 
work suggests—that our current trademark vocabulary maps un-
easily to reality. We are unlikely to return to the days when a 
trademark functioned simply as an indication of the manufacturer of 
a particular good. Trademarks today are simply one part of an over-
all brand experience that aims to transform the brand into a perso-
na, engaging consumers at an emotional level. Consumers, for their 
part, use trademarks not just as a shorthand for the physical quali-
ties of a product but as a way of signaling their own emotional par-
ticipation and identity, which then feeds back into the meaning of 
the brand in a continuous loop.22 So we should not be too surprised 
when consumers base purchasing decisions on the reputation of the 
brand—after all, they are responding to the encouragement they are 
given to view their connection to the brand as a relationship rather 
than simply as a transaction. Nor should we be too surprised when 
trademark owners claim to have experienced harms from unauthor-
ized uses of their mark that sound more in defamation or right of 
publicity rather than diversion of sales. When brands are commonly 
described as having personalities,23 and marketers have long talked 
about brands in anthropological terms, it is not a huge leap for 
brand owners to claim reputational injury and disruption to self-
definition as salient harms. Ideally, then, efforts to reform trade-
                                                                                                                                                             
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), for example, have generated considerably more 
public debate than its trademark decisions in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 
418 (2003), Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, 539 U.S. 23 (2003), and KP 
Permanent Make-Up, Inc., v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). On fair use in 
trademark, see William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 
2267, 2295–96 (2010). The Lanham Act’s antidilution provision does contain a fair use 
defense, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A), but this has not been much litigated. 
22 Jonah Berger & Morgan Ward, Subtle Signals of Inconspicuous Consumption, 37 J. 
Consumer Res. 555, 559 (2010) (“The meaning of consumption (e.g., brands, products, 
and cultural tastes) is not static, and it can shift based on the social identity of the indi-
viduals who hold those tastes.”); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in 
Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 427, 455 (2010) (noting that consumers “invest their favor-
ite brands with personal loyalty, developing bonds that mimic the dynamics of personal 
relationships”); Jeremy Sheff, Brand Renegades, 1 N.Y.U. J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. Law 128, 
129 (2011). 
23 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Aaker, Dimensions of Brand Personality, 34 J. Mktg. Res. 347 
(1997). 
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mark law should take account of the ways in which brand reputa-
tion and meaning have become an integral part of the producer-
consumer relationship. 
Recognizing these kinds of injuries doesn’t mean, however, that 
most such claims are valid or that there aren’t competing interests 
at stake. It is particularly important, given the modern brand perso-
na and the possibility of broad claims by trademark owners, to en-
sure that adjudication of such claims takes account both of consum-
ers’ interest in brand reputation and of consumers’ interest in 
expression. Thus, Professor McKenna’s focus on deception and ma-
teriality has relevance for these claims as well. The law can, for ex-
ample, require that the alleged harm to reputation result from a 
false assertion about the plaintiff or its alleged sponsorship, not 
merely from critique, parody, or other nonfalsifiable communica-
tions. The law can require greater attention to the effect of such as-
sertions on consumer behavior in the marketplace rather than simp-
ly taking broad claims at face value, thus ensuring (to the extent 
possible) that it is reputational harm, and not merely hurt feelings, 
at issue.24 And we can view the law as having normative force rather 
than simply descriptive power, shaping consumers’ approach to 
reputation-related assertions by disregarding clearly unreasonable 
interpretations of such communications.25 Each of these decisions, 
however, requires a preliminary understanding of the harms we be-
lieve the law should care about and, then, a discussion of how exist-
ing doctrine might apply to those harms. 
To be clear, my differences with Professor McKenna’s views are 
minor. He is quite right, I think, to call for careful attention to the na-
ture of consumers’ interests and for legal standards, such as materi-
ality, that help to ensure that alleged harms are worth vindicating. 
Where we part company, at least for now, is on the question of 
whether consumers’ interests can lie not only in the choices con-
sumers make to acquire goods and services in the marketplace but 
also in the choices they make to refrain from buying goods and ser-
                                                                    
24 Professor McKenna rightly criticizes courts that conclude that a false attribution of 
sponsorship or authorization is harmful, without more, McKenna, supra note 1, at 97–
98, and is also correct when he suggests that some courts are not careful to determine 
whether the consumers at issue are indeed likely future purchasers (such as in the 
post-sale confusion cases), id. at 103–04. 
25 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or 
Fait Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461, 487–88 (2005) (discussing trademark law’s role as a 
creator, rather than as a reflector, of social norms); Heymann, supra note 5, at 1432. 
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vices. (Such choices are particularly important in markets in which 
the reputation of the provider may be the key factor driving the con-
sumer’s decision-making process.) In my view, by thoughtfully high-
lighting the artlessness of some of our accepted trademark termi-
nology, Professor McKenna has also implicitly raised additional 
questions about trademark law’s scope in the age of the brand per-
sona. Although there has been important scholarly work on this top-
ic,26 we have not yet had the kind of public discussion of trademark 
law’s purpose and constituencies that we have seen develop around 
copyright law in recent years. Trademark law is in need of more of 
that type of engagement. 
 
                                                                    
26 Jessica Litman’s article “Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertis-
ing Age,” 108 Yale L.J. 1717 (1999), was particularly prescient in this regard. Jessica 
Silbey’s recent work, in which she provides a qualitative analysis of motivations for 
creativity (including reputational concerns), is also instructive. Jessica Silbey, Harvest-
ing Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-Makes-Work,” Two Stages in 
the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2091 (2011). 
